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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 11-3842 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ISHMAEL GARRETT, 
 
                                        Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 09-cr-00241-009) 
District Judge:  Honorable Edwin M. Kosik 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 23, 2012 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 13, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Ishmael Garrett appeals his judgment of sentence on drug-related crimes.  He asks 
us to revisit whether a prior conviction under Pennsylvania‘s misdemeanor resisting arrest 
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statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5104, qualifies as a ―crime of violence‖ under the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG).  Because we have previously held that resisting 
arrest in Pennsylvania is a crime of violence, United States v. Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 466 
(3d Cir. 2010), and because the District Court correctly assessed Garrett‘s criminal 
history, we will affirm. 
I 
 We write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, so we review only 
briefly the essential facts and procedural history. 
 Garrett pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to distribute and possess with 
intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and two counts 
of distribution and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  Because Garrett was designated a career 
offender, his offense level was 31 and his criminal history category was VI, which 
resulted in a Guidelines range of 188–235 months‘ imprisonment.  The Government 
recommended a downward departure of two offense levels for substantial assistance, 
which would have resulted in a Guidelines range of 151–188 months. 
 At sentencing, Garrett objected to his designation as a career offender, arguing that 
his Pennsylvania state conviction for resisting arrest was not a crime of violence.  The 
District Court disagreed.  Nevertheless, on the strength of the Government‘s motion for 
downward departure, and after considering Garrett‘s individual history and 
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characteristics, the District Court sentenced Garrett to a term of 110 months‘ 
imprisonment to be followed by a four-year term of supervised release. 
II 
 Garrett raises three issues on appeal: (1) the District Court‘s decision to classify 
him as a career offender; (2) the assessment of criminal history points for his prior 
convictions; and (3) the Court‘s failure to vary downward even further based on over-
representation of his criminal history. 
 We review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion, looking first for 
procedural error and then examining the sentence for substantive reasonableness.  United 
States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2008).  We review a district court‘s legal 
interpretation of the Guidelines de novo.  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (en banc).  ―[I]f [an] asserted procedural error is purely factual, our review is 
highly deferential and we will conclude there has been an abuse of discretion only if the 
district court‘s findings are clearly erroneous.‖  Wise, 515 F.3d at 217.  In evaluating a 
challenge to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we must affirm ―unless no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 
defendant for the reasons the district court provided.‖  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 
558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
A 
 Garrett argues that the District Court erred in designating him a career offender 
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because his Pennsylvania conviction for resisting arrest is not a crime of violence.  Nor is 
it a predicate offense, Garrett contends, because he initially received an aggregate 
sentence of only twelve months‘ probation for the crime.  Garrett is incorrect on both 
counts. 
 According to Pennsylvania‘s resisting arrest statute,  
 
[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with the intent of 
preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any 
other duty, the person [1] creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the 
public servant or anyone else, or [2] employs means justifying or requiring 
substantial force to overcome the resistance. 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5104.  
 To qualify as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, Garrett must have 
―at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled 
substance offense.‖  USSG § 4B1.1(a).  The Guidelines define a ―crime of violence‖ to 
include any offense that 
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another, or  
 
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.  
 
USSG § 4B1.2(a).  
 Garrett contends that his conviction for resisting arrest is not a crime of violence.  
But we held precisely the opposite in Stinson, 592 F.3d at 464–66, which Garrett failed to 
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cite in his opening brief.
1
  Garrett claims that because he only briefly fled from police and 
quickly surrendered, his actions underlying his resisting arrest offense do not involve 
―purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct‖ and therefore do not amount to a crime of 
violence.  See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137,144–45 (2008) (finding New 
Mexico‘s DUI offense was not a violent felony in part because it does not involve 
―purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct‖). 
 Garrett‘s argument fails because Stinson established that a conviction under 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 5104 satisfies the second clause of the definition of ―crime of violence,‖ in 
which the phrase ―physical force‖ does not appear.  Stinson held that both means of 
violating the Pennsylvania resisting arrest statute—―[1] creat[ing] a substantial risk of 
bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or [2] employ[ing] means justifying or 
requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance‖—fit within the residual clause of 
the Guidelines definition because § 5104 does not cover passive resistance, such as ―lying 
down‖ or ―going limp.‖  Stinson, 592 F.3d at 465–66.  Therefore, it criminalized only 
―purposeful, violent, and aggressive‖ acts that present a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.  Id. at 466 (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 144).  Even assuming Garrett 
accurately frames the conduct that led to his resisting arrest conviction, running from the 
                                                 
1
 Counsel is cautioned in future cases to be mindful that ―[a] lawyer shall not 
knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction 
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client . . . .‖  Pa. Rule of 
Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(2) (2012). 
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police to avoid arrest ―involves conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to 
another‖ as distinguished from mere passive resistance.  Therefore, Garrett‘s resisting 
arrest offense falls squarely within Stinson‘s definition of a crime of violence. 
 Garrett also argues that his resisting arrest conviction cannot be counted as a crime 
of violence because he initially received a sentence of twelve months‘ probation.  Under 
USSG § 4B1.1, a sentence for resisting arrest should be counted toward career offender 
status only if ―the sentence was a term of probation of more than one year or a term of 
imprisonment of at least thirty days . . . .‖  See USSG § 4B1.2 cmt 3 (citing USSG 
§ 4A1.2(c)).  Garrett‘s initial sentence is immaterial, however, because his probation was 
revoked and he was resentenced to 23 days to 23½ months‘ imprisonment.  That sentence 
is implicated by the Guidelines, which state: 
Revocation of probation, parole, supervised release, special parole, or 
mandatory release may affect the time period under which certain sentences 
are counted as provided in § 4A1.2(d)(2) and (e). 
 
USSG § 4A1.2(k)(2). 
 Under § 4A1.2(e)(1), ―[a]ny prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year 
and one month that was imposed within the fifteen years of the defendant‘s 
commencement of the instant offense is counted.‖  Garrett‘s revocation sentence of 23½ 
months imprisonment was imposed on June 2, 2004.  Garrett‘s offense conduct, which at 
the very latest occurred in March 2009 when he sold cocaine to a confidential source, fell 
within the required fifteen year window.  Thus, it counts toward career offender status 
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under § 4B1.1. 
 For these reasons, the District Court did not err in finding that Garrett‘s previous 
conviction for resisting arrest qualified as a predicate offense for purposes of the career 
offender Guideline. 
B 
 Garrett next argues that the District Court erred in assessing one criminal history 
point for his conviction for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and 
three criminal history points for resisting arrest.  We disagree. 
 Garrett contends that he should have been assessed no points for his July 14, 1999 
conviction for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.  Under USSG 
§ 4A1.1(c), a defendant should receive one point unless the sentence was ―imposed more 
than ten years prior to the defendant‘s commencement of the instant offense . . . .‖  
§ 4A1.1(c) cmt 3.  As reviewed above, Garrett‘s offense conduct dates back to at least 
March of 2009, when he sold cocaine to a confidential informant.  Because March 2009 is 
within ten years of July 1999, the District Court was correct to assess Garrett one point 
for his controlled substance conviction. 
 Garrett also argues that he should have been assessed one point for his resisting 
arrest conviction instead of three points under §§ 4A1.1(a) and 4A1.2(c) because he was 
originally sentenced to twelve months‘ probation.  This initial sentence is of no help to 
Garrett, however, because he was sentenced to 23½ months in prison after his probation 
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was revoked.  Accordingly, USSG § 4A1.2(c) does not apply. 
 For the reasons stated, the District Court did not err in assessing Garrett one point 
for his controlled substance conviction and three points for his resisting arrest conviction. 
C 
 Finally, Garrett contends that his Guidelines range should have been 70–87 months 
because he should have had nine criminal history points and an offense level of 23.  This 
argument is based on the fallacious premises that the Court improperly found Garrett to 
be a career offender and that he should have been assessed no criminal history points for 
his controlled substance conviction and one point for resisting arrest.  As we have 
explained, the District Court correctly found Garrett to be a career offender and properly 
assessed one and three points for the controlled substance and resisting arrest convictions, 
respectively. 
 Alternatively, Garrett argues that even if the Court correctly computed his 
Guidelines range, a downward variance was nonetheless justified considering the 
discretionary factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because his career offender status over-
represented his criminal history.  The District Court took into account the Presentence 
Investigation Report and the Government‘s departure recommendation.  It also considered 
Garrett‘s requests for a downward departure and for a variance under § 3553(a).  The 
Court‘s final sentencing determination was 110 months‘ imprisonment, which was 41 
months below what the Guidelines range would have been following the Government‘s 
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motion and 30 months below what the Guidelines range would have been had the District 
Court applied a one-category reduction for over-representation.  See USSG 
§ 4A1.3(b)(3)(A).  Because the record shows that the District Court adequately 
considered the § 3553(a) factors, we cannot find that the sentence as a whole was 
substantively unreasonable.  See Grier, 475 F.3d at 571 (―The touchstone of 
‗reasonableness‘ is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful 
consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).‖). 
 Accordingly, the District Court did not commit procedural or substantive error in 
imposing Garrett‘s sentence. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‘s judgment of 
sentence. 
